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Racial inequalities in education have equity and efficiency implications.  While they exacerbate 
social inequalities and hinder intergenerational mobility, they also constitute a waste of human 
capital potential. Although racial inequalities in education have narrowed in the 20th century, 
educational gaps between students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds are still wide in 
several countries (Marteleto 2012; O’Gorman 2010). Therefore, in order to close gaps in access 
and outcomes, affirmative actions with different designs have been implemented throughout 
recent years and have included measures such as preferential treatment in admission processes, 
race-specific financial aid and scholarship policies (Arcidiacono 2005; Ibarra 2001).  
An alternative and sometimes complementary approach has been the introduction of racial and 
ethnic quotas. At the higher education level, this measure consists of pre-establishing a share of 
seats in institutions to specific racial and/or ethnic groups and has been applied in countries such 
as Brazil, India and Malaysia. Those in favor of the implementation of these policies usually 
allude to their effects on the enrolment of minority groups, especially in more selective programs, 
and consequently to the potential labor market gains for these individuals (Rothstein and Yoon 
2008b; Loury and Garman 1993). Those who oppose racial/ ethnic quotas ground their concerns 
on the so-called “mismatch hypothesis”: minority students who are admitted through the quotas 
may never catch up with their college peers due to the previous accumulated learning deficits; 
thus, racial and ethnic quotas may do more harm than good to these students as they would benefit 
more from courses/institutions more suited to their skills (Frisancho and Krishna 2016; Rochstein 
and Yoon 2008a; Loury and Garman 1993 and 1995).  
Interestingly, an additional issue that has been less explored by the literature regards the incentives 
to human capital accumulation that these policies yield to targeted students prior to college 
admissions – indeed, the few empirical research works that have investigated these effects reached 
diverging results (for instance, Saeme 2014 and Assunção and Ferman 2015). Moreover, there is 
a well-established literature on the importance of students’ pre-college accumulated human 
capital in explaining the variation in college graduates’ earnings (Walker and Zhu 2018; Dale and 
Krueger 2002 and 2014). Therefore, understanding the ex-ante effects of racial quotas is crucial 
not only to unravel the incentives provided by affirmative action but also because they play a key 
role in labor market success. 
In this paper, we evaluate the ex-ante effects of a law that implemented quotas in higher education 
in Brazil. Differences in access to higher education by race are significant in this country: in the 
year 2010, according to Censo IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatítica) and the 
Higher Education Census, black and brown persons represented 51% of the total population, but 
accounted for only 34% of higher education enrolments, whereas white persons made up 48% of 
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the population and 63% of enrolments. In an attempt to mitigate this inequality of access to higher 
education, the federal government created in 2013 what came to be known as the Law of Quotas, 
establishing that a proportion of seats in Brazilian federal universities should be filled by non-
white and low-income students from public high schools. In this research, we study the effects of 
the law on students’ pre-college academic performance; that is, we investigate whether the 
increase in enrolment by these students was due only  to the existence of an increased number of 
reserved seats or whether the policy itself had a positive incentive effect on human capital 
accumulation (i.e., if there were efficiency gains). More specifically, we focus on evaluating the 
efficiency effects of the racial criteria of the law.  
We assess these effects by examining the extent to which the Law of Quotas affected the 
performance of students in the college entrance exam, the ENEM1. To this end, we employ a 
difference-in-differences approach by explicitly controlling for a set of student-specific variables 
contained in the ENEM’s microdata. The repeated cross-sectional database provides information 
on socioeconomic factors, income, parental education, previous work experience and previous 
academic effort. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to take advantage of a major 
country-level quotas law to investigate such effects on a national scale. We show that the law 
fostered incentives to pre-college human capital accumulation as it induced eligible students to 
attain higher scores on the ENEM exam.  Furthermore, we test for the existence of heterogeneous 
effects by subject, gender and parental education. We also estimate both a two-periods difference-
in-differences model and a regression with dynamic treatment effects.  
This research shows that the effects of the law were greater in more quantitative-intensive subjects 
(Math and Natural Science) and that the impact of the law increased throughout the first years 
after its implementation. We do not find any evidence, however, that the effects of the law were 
distinct between genders and between students with and without a college-educated parent. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on the effects of 
racial quotas. Section 3 expands on the institutional setting of the Brazilian educational system 
and of the Law of Quotas. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy employed in the 
paper. Section 5 presents the results of the difference-in-differences models. Section 6 discusses 
the main implications of our findings. Finally, section 7 presents some conclusions. 
 
2. Educational quotas in higher education 
The introduction of racial and ethnic quotas in college admissions has become a common practice 
in a number of countries. In the United States, even though such policies have not been prescribed 
 
1 Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio. 
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by the Constitution, several guidelines issued by the U.S. education and justice departments have 
encouraged institutions to grant preferential treatment to applicants from minority groups in 
admissions to universities (Department of Education and Department of Justice, 2011). Moreover, 
in countries such as India, Malaysia and Brazil, a step further has been taken as these practices 
have been institutionalized by federal laws establishing that a certain percentage of seats in 
education institutions should be filled by specific racial or ethnic groups. 
Economists have long been interested in understanding how these policies affect the college 
enrolment of students who benefit from the quotas (quota holders) as well as their effects on 
performance in higher education. The effects of such policies on college enrolment are rather 
controversial, as there is a large body of evidence suggesting that affirmative action plays an 
important role in increasing the enrolment of minority groups in higher education, especially in 
more selective programs (Vieira and Kuenning 2019; Francis and Tanuri-Pianto 2012; Tienda et 
al. 2008; Dickson 2006; Long 2004a and 2004b; Bowen and Bok 1998).  
However, the effects of racial quotas on performance are still a subject of discussion. One concern 
that has been thoroughly explored is related to the initial gap between quota holders and their 
college peers, and their capacity to catch up with the remaining students as they progress through 
college. Evidence on this subject is mixed, as some studies indicate that minority students tend to 
fall behind their same-major peers (Frisancho and Krishna 2015; Sander 2004), while others find 
that there are no significant differences between each group’s college achievement (Queiroz et al. 
2015) or even that it varies depending on the major or on the student’s social and academic 
background (Vidigal 2018; Ribas et al. 2015).  
Although there is substantial literature on the ex-post effects of educational quotas, that is, the 
effects on quota holders after college admissions outcomes are determined, the ex-ante effects of 
such policies have been significantly less explored, and a particularly relevant issue concerns the 
incentives that these quotas provide to pre-college human capital accumulation. The incentive 
effects of affirmative action on pre-college human capital accumulation have been explored 
mostly from a theoretical perspective, and the results are ambiguous. On the one hand, such 
policies might lead to ex-post discrimination of minority groups, as argued by Coate and Loury 
(1993), Loury (1992), Milgron and Oster (1987) and Lundberg and Startz (1983), or even to more 
complacent students due to the high numbers of reservation quotas, especially among the smartest 
section of the minority group, as stressed by Kight and Hebl (2005) and Assunção and Ferman 
(2015), which could encourage quota-eligible students to reduce skill acquisition during basic 
school. On the other hand, affirmative policies might mitigate the so-called “discouragement 
effects”, dislocating the students to the margin of selection and increasing the willingness to re-
allocate leisure time towards building human capital as pointed out by Cotton et al. (2016) and 
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Furstenberg (2003). It has also been suggested that whether the incentives to invest in human 
capital are improved by affirmative action depends on the level of discrimination of the 
economy’s initial equilibrium (Moro and Norman 2003). 
Empirical investigations on the incentive effects of educational quotas, however, are still scarce.  
Khanna (2020) evaluates the effects of reservation quotas for college seats and government jobs 
in pre-college years of schooling in India and finds that affirmative action incentivizes about 0.8 
additional years of education for the average minority group student and 1.2 more years of 
education for a student from a marginal minority subgroup.  
In the Brazilian context, the literature has been mostly restricted to specific universities that have 
implemented racial quotas in their admission processes of their own will prior to the 2012 Law 
of Quotas. Saeme (2014) investigates the implementation of a 40% quota for black persons in the 
Federal University of São Carlos (UFScar) and finds that black students from public schools in 
São Paulo scored 1.54% higher on the ENEM as a result of the introduction of quotas in UFSCar 
admissions, while Francis and Tanuri-Pianto (2012) evaluate the adoption of racial quotas at the 
University of Brasilia in 2004 and find that the quotas did not reduce pre-college effort (it might 
have even raised pre-college effort, although the evidence is tenuous). Conversely, Assunção and 
Ferman (2015) evaluate the effects of the implementation of quotas in three public Universities 
in the States of Rio de Janeiro and Bahia from 2002 to 2004 and find that these quotas induced 
targeted groups to attain lower high school scores.  
The introduction of the Law of Quotas in 2012 in Brazil, which ensured the implementation of 
racial quotas in all of the federal universities in the country, created an advantageous setup to 
expand the understanding of the ex-ante effects of these quotas and finally provide more clarity 
in the direction of these incentives. Most of the research that has been undertaken to evaluate the 
impact of the law, however, has focused on its effects on college enrolment and ex-post college 
performance (Vidigal 2018; Queiroz et al. 2015; Ribas et al. 2015). 
Indeed, the effects of the law on students’ pre-college behavior have been largely ignored by the 
literature. While Mello (2019) investigated how the Law of Quotas impacted the ex-ante decision 
between attending a private or public high school (since the law was only applicable to students 
that had previously attended public high schools), the effects of the law on pre-college academic 
performance are, to the best of our knowledge, yet to be examined. Therefore, we contribute to 
the literature by presenting causal evidence of the impact of an affirmative policy on pre-college 





3. Social and Institutional Background 
In this section, we describe the social and institutional background relevant to this paper. 
Subsection 3.1 describes some key demographic characteristics of the Brazilian population; 
subsection 3.2 outlines the structure of the Brazilian higher education system; subsection 3.3 
provides information on the ENEM exam; and finally, subsection 3.4 describes the 2012 Law of 
Quotas. 
3.1. Socio-demographic characteristics 
The Brazilian population’s racial composition stems from a confluence of many different ethnic 
backgrounds, from indigenous people, black Africans and Portuguese that represented the 
majority of Brazil’s inhabitants in the colonization period to the subsequent waves of Europeans, 
Arabs and Asians that arrived in the country throughout the 20th century. Consequently, most of 
the Brazilian population possesses some degree of mixed-race ancestry, which has led researchers 
that investigate the racial dynamics in the country to focus on the so-called black-to-white 
continuum. 
The black-to-white continuum encompasses 99% of the Brazilian population and the national 
institute responsible for collecting and reporting sociodemographic data (the IBGE, Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) uses three different racial terms to identify individuals 
among this continuum: white (branco, which represents 48% of the country’s population), brown 
(pardo, 43% of the population) and black (preto, 8% of the population). The remaining 1% of the 
population is composed mainly of Asians and indigenous ethnicities. Table 1 shows that the racial 











Table 1 - Racial Composition by Brazilian State 
Region State White Black Asian Brown Indigenous 
Brazil Brazil 48% 8% 1% 43% 0.4% 
North Rondônia 35% 7% 1% 56% 1% 
 Acre 24% 6% 2% 66% 2% 
 Amazonas 21% 4% 1% 69% 5% 
 Roraima 21% 6% 1% 61% 11% 
 Pará 22% 7% 1% 70% 1% 
 Amapá 24% 9% 1% 65% 1% 
 Tocantins 25% 9% 2% 63% 1% 
Northeast Maranhão 22% 10% 1% 67% 1% 
 Piauí 24% 9% 2% 64% 0% 
 Ceará 32% 5% 1% 62% 0% 
 Rio Grande do Norte 41% 5% 1% 52% 0% 
 Paraíba 40% 6% 1% 53% 1% 
 Pernambuco 37% 6% 1% 55% 1% 
 Alagoas 32% 7% 1% 60% 0% 
 Sergipe 28% 9% 1% 61% 0% 
 Bahia 22% 17% 1% 59% 0% 
Southeast Minas Gerais 45% 9% 1% 44% 0% 
 Espírito Santo 42% 8% 1% 49% 0% 
 Rio de Janeiro 47% 12% 1% 39% 0% 
 São Paulo 64% 6% 1% 29% 0% 
South Paraná 70% 3% 1% 25% 0% 
 Santa Catarina 84% 3% 0% 12% 0% 
 Rio Grande do Sul 83% 6% 0% 11% 0% 
Central West Mato Grosso do Sul 47% 5% 1% 44% 3% 
 Mato Grosso 37% 8% 1% 52% 1% 
 Goiás 42% 7% 2% 50% 0% 
 Distrito Federal 42% 8% 2% 48% 0% 
 
Source: 2010 Census - IBGE 
Among the three largest racial groups in the country (white, black and brown persons), a common 
concern is the substantial educational disparity between them, especially in terms of access to 
higher education. According to the IBGE2, in 2010, 13% of the white population had a college 
degree, whereas the same was true for only 4% of the black and brown population. By 2019, these 
figures had evolved to 21% for white persons and 9% for black and brown persons. Moreover, 
the uneven playing field in the educational sphere also contributes to the perpetuation of 
inequality in income levels. In 2010, the average income for the white population was 1.9 times 
larger than it was for the black and brown population, while in 2019 it was 1.8 times larger.  
 
2 Census for 2010 data and PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio) for 2019 data 
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3.2. Higher Education in Brazil 
According to the 2019 Higher Education Census, the Brazilian Higher Education system serves 
8.6 million students (in 2019, the average enrolment rate of individuals between 18 and 24 years 
old was 20.4%) and consists of 2,608 institutions, among which 2,306 (or 88%) are private and 
302 (or 12%) are public. Private institutions, which are fee-paying, contain the vast majority of 
enrollments (6.5 million students in 2019, or nearly 76% of total enrollments). Each private 
institution has complete independence regarding tuition fees and runs its own admission process, 
which usually consists of written exams developed by the institution itself. Public institutions, in 
turn, are predominantly free of charge3 and are managed by either the federal, state or municipal 
government. Federal (110) and State (132) HEIs (Higher Education Institutions) encompass most 
of the public enrollments (62% and 32%, respectively), while Municipal institutions (60) account 
for only 6% of public enrollments. 
Public HEIs are generally more prestigious and since they are mostly tuition-free, these 
institutions have the most competitive selection processes in the country4. Until 2010, the 
admission process to public HEIs was highly decentralized and most institutions developed their 
own exam –indeed, some of them used the ENEM as part of the selection criteria. This structure 
led to tests with widely different contents and to a highly localized higher education market, since 
it induced students to restrict their study and preparation to admission processes for specific 
universities. On that count, in 2010 the Ministry of Education created the Sistema de Seleção 
Unificada (SISU), an online platform where Federal and State universities could use the grades 
of the students in the national standardized exam (the ENEM) for their admission processes. In 
order to be eligible for admission, students who take the ENEM exam must then complete a SISU 





3 Institutions maintained by federal and state levels of governments are forbidden by law to charge tuition 
fees, but municipal institutions are allowed and usually charge some tuition fees. 
4 Federal and State universities have higher average scores in the Índice Geral de Cursos (IGC), a quality 
index developed by the Ministry of Education, and comprise most of the higher ranked institutions in the 
Ranking Universitário Folha (RUF), an annual evaluation of the HEIs in Brazil developed by the Folha de 
São Paulo newspaper. According to Binelli et al. (2008), there were on average 9 applicants per seat at 




3.3. The Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio (ENEM) 
The ENEM is a national non-mandatory standardized exam organized by the INEP (Instituto 
Nacional de Estudo e Pesquisas Educaionais Anísio Teixeira) within the Ministry of Education 
that takes place once a year in Brazil, usually around October, and it is one of the largest national 
exams in the world with a yearly average, between 2010 and 2019, of 6.5 million test takers. 
Created in 1998 with the purpose of evaluating high school students’ performance and learning, 
it now plays a multiple role: it is a mandatory exam for the SISU application (and therefore serves 
as an entrance exam to many HEIs in the country); one of the selection criteria in the Prouni 
(Universidade para Todos), a federal scholarship program established in 2005; and it is also used 
to evaluate and compare the quality of high school institutions in the country. 
The ENEM is comprised of one multiple choice exam and one essay. The multiple choice (or 
objective) exam consists of four different subjects: natural sciences, social sciences, languages 
and math. In general, the natural science test covers physics, chemistry and biology related 
contents; the social sciences test covers history, geography, sociology and philosophy related 
contents; the languages test covers a broad range of contents from Portuguese and foreign 
languages to literature, arts and related topics; and finally the math exam encompasses solely 
mathematics. In the essay (or written exam), candidates must discourse upon a topic of public 
interest (usually about Brazilian social, political and/or economic issues). A detailed description 
of the ENEM is provided in the ENEM’s Act (Edital do ENEM) and Syllabus (Matriz de 
Referência ENEM). 
3.4. The 2012 Law of Quotas 
As stated in subsection 3.1, access to higher education is significantly unequal in Brazil and has 
historically lacked representation of non-white students. Moreover, the inequality of access 
between students who attended private high schools and those who attended a public institution 
has also been an ongoing concern. According to IBGE’s Síntese de Indicadores Sociais, in 2017, 
79% of private high school graduates progressed to tertiary education, while the same was true 
for only 36% of graduates from public schools. 
In view of that picture, a handful of Brazilian public universities began to implement racial quotas 
in their admission processes in the early 2000s. Finally, in August 2012, the Brazilian federal 
government established the Law 12.711/2012, which later came to be known as the Law of 
Quotas. The law stated that at least 50% of places in Federal HEIs should be filled by students 
that had attended the entire high school period (in Brazil, this consists of 3 years) in a public 
institution. Among this group, at least 50% (that is, 25% of the total) should be filled by students 
from public schools whose per capita family income amounts to at most one and a half times the 
minimum wage (approximately US$300 per month in 2020), and at least  X% (that is, X*50% of 
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the total) should be filled by black, brown, and indigenous students (from this point forward, we 
shall refer to this group as non-white) from public schools, where X represents the share of non-
white students in the respective HEI’s State population according to the 2010 Census. Figure 1 
summarizes the rules of the law in a diagram. 
Figure 1 - The 2012 Law of Quotas 
 
Note: The diagram above presents a simulation of the reserved places in a hypothetical federal 
university in which the total number of places equals 100 and in which the State’s non-white 
individuals’ percentage is of 40% (hence, 40% of 25 = 10). 
Although it was announced in 2012, the law stated that HEIs had until 2016 to fully implement 
the quotas, but a minimum of 25% of the reserved seats should be implemented in each year from 
2013 onwards. Therefore, universities had to reserve at least 12.5% of their seats in 2013, at least 
25% in 2014, at least 37.5% in 2015 and finally the pre-established share of 50% in 2016, at the 
latest. Figure 2 illustrates the rate at which the law was implemented by universities.  
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Figure 2 - Average Percentage of Reserved Places in Federal Universities throughout the Years 
 
Source: GEMAA (Grupo de Estudos Multidisciplinares de Ação Afirmativa) 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data 
This paper uses publicly available ENEM microdata, which has been published yearly since 1998 
by the INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudo e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira), an agency 
linked to the Ministry of Education. This repeated cross-sectional database provides information 
on the ENEM scores and key individual and household level variables of all students who sat the 
exam. Until 2008, the ENEM consisted of one essay and 63 multiple choice questions, with a 
score ranging from 0 to 100. In 2009, however, the exam was completely reformulated and, from 
that year onwards, the number of multiple choice questions increased to 180 (divided into 4 
categories: natural science, social science, mathematics and languages) and all of the scores, 
including the essay, were measured on a scale from 0 to 1000, using the Item Response Theory5. 
Additionally, from 2009 onwards, the scores between different years have become comparable 
(ENEM – Guia do participante) and students were consequently allowed to use scores from 
previous years in the SISU application. 
The ENEM’s microdata on individual and household characteristics comes from a mandatory 
self-declared questionnaire that all the candidates must fill out when signing up for the exam. The 
 
5 The probability of obtaining a correct answer is assessed according to its difficulty, the probability that a 
student could guess a correct answer, and its ability to discriminate against students.  
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survey contains questions on basic socioeconomic factors (such as race, gender, age, marital 
status, city of residence, etc.), level of family income, parental education, high school record (if 
the candidate has ever been held back or dropped out of school), work-related factors (if and how 
much had the candidate worked during his/her life), school type in which the candidate was 
enrolled during high school and fundamental school (public or private), among others. It is 
important to note that the ENEM’s microdata is not a panel data, since the set of students that take 
the exam changes every year, and even if a student takes the ENEM exam more than once, the 
database does not allow us to track this student’s performance over time. However, as will be 
seen in the next subsection, in order to estimate the difference-in-differences model, we will 
cluster the students into specific groups that can be tracked throughout the years. 
We will be looking at the years from 2010 to 2016, since the latter was the final year for the Law 
of Quotas to be fully implemented by all the institutions. We will not incorporate years prior to 
2010 in our model, since the format and many of the mandatory questions from the ENEM’s 
survey changed as of that year. We select students who had already completed high school or 
were to complete it in the year of the exam and those who actually attended the test. Hence, we 
exclude the students who only signed up for the exam but did not take it and those who were 
taking it as a practice test before graduating high school. Also, as mentioned earlier, we shall 
focus our analysis on the racial criteria of the law, since the ENEM’s microdata only discloses 
income information on intervals of minimum wage, which hampers the evaluation of the effects 
of the law on individuals who are on the threshold of the income criteria. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
models to be presented in subsection 4.2. As displayed in Table 3, the percentage of non-white 
applicants on the ENEM exam increased significantly throughout the entire timespan of the 
database, especially after the implementation of the Law of Quotas (first put into effect in 2013). 
Furthermore, the variables used in the study were chosen such that we could preserve the largest 
amount of available data (that is, we gave priority to the mandatory questions of the ENEM’ 
questionnaire) and, as shown in Table 3, the percentage of missing information is low and this 







Table 2 - Key Variables 
Variables Description 
Age Numerical 
Gender Masculine or feminine 
Marital status Single, married, divorced or widowed 
State State of residence (27 federative units of Brazil) 
Degree of ruralization Percentage of rural households in the city of residence 
High school type Entirely in public school, entirely in private school or mixed  
Average income Average per capita family income in intervals of minimum wages 
Race/Ethnicity White, black, brown, indigenous or other 
Parental education Parental higher degree of education (6 categories)  
Work factor Dummy: 1 if student has ever worked before 
Dropout/Grade repetition Dummy: 1 if student has ever been held back or dropped out in HS 















Table 3 - Summary Statistics 
Variables 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Age - mean (sd) 22.5 (7.2) 22.2 (7.0) 22.3 (7.2) 22.7 (7.5) 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Gender (M; F) 40%; 60%  40%; 60%  41%; 59% 42%; 58%  
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Marital status (S; M; other) 86%; 14%; 0% 86%; 14%; 0% 87%; 12%; 1% 86%; 12%; 2% 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Ruralization - mean (sd) 11.5% (17%) 12% (17%) 12.1% (17%) 12.4% (17%) 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
High school (pub.; priv. + 
mix.) 
79%; 21% 79%; 21% 79%; 21% 80%; 20% 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Average income - mean (sd) 1 mw (1.5) 0.7 mw (1.1) 0.8 mw (1.05) 0.7 mw (1.02) 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 









missing 3.3% 2.4% 1.7% 1.6% 
Work factor 55% Y; 45% N 54% Y; 46% N 59% Y; 41% N 61% Y; 39% N 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Dropout/Grade Repetition 19% Y; 81% N 19% Y; 81% N 18% Y; 82% N 19% Y; 81% N 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Variables 2014 2015 2016 2010-2016 
Age - mean (sd) 23.1 (7.7) 22.5 (7.3) 22.3 (7.2) 22.5 (7.3) 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Gender (M; F) 42%; 58%  42%; 58%  42%; 58%  41%; 59%  
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Marital status (S; M; other) 85%; 13%; 2% 88%; 10%; 2% 89%; 9%; 1% 87%; 12%; 1% 
missing 0% 3.5% 3.5% 1.2% 
Ruralization - mean (sd) 12.3% (17%) 11.9% (17%) 12% (18%) 12% (17%) 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
High school (pub.; priv. + 
mix.) 
83%; 17% 81%; 19% 81%; 19% 81%; 19% 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Average income - mean (sd) 0.7 mw (1.02) 0.8 mw (1.1) 0.7 mw (1.02) 0.7 mw (1.1) 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 









missing 1.4% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 
Work factor 62% Y; 38% N 59% Y; 41% N 54% Y; 46% N 58% Y; 42% N 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Dropout/Grade Repetition 17% Y; 83% N 16% Y; 84% N 15% Y; 85% N 17% Y; 83% N 
missing 0% 0% 0% 0% 






4.2. Methodology  
In order to study the causal effects of the creation of the Law of Quotas on the students’ ENEM 
performances, we employ a difference-in-differences methodology. The idea behind this 
approach is fairly simple. Outcomes are observed before and after a specific treatment and 
between two groups; a treatment group that was exposed to the treatment and a control group that 
was not exposed to it.  The treatment effect is then estimated by comparing the change in outcome 
between the two groups, while a set of control variables is added to the model in order to control 
for the individuals’ specific characteristics. The fact that the Law of Quotas only applied to certain 
students and the presence of “clean” individuals who were unaffected by it makes difference-in-
differences an appropriate methodology to evaluate the causal effects of the law on students’ 
ENEM scores. 
Before going into the details of our model, let us recall that the law applies to all students who 
have attended public high schools, but it provides special benefits for those who are non-white, 
since among the reserved seats based on the school criteria, there is a pre-established share of 
seats based on the racial criteria (see Figure 1). We will then separately estimate the effects of 
each one of these components of the Law of Quotas, which we shall call the “school component” 
and the “racial component”, on the students’ ENEM scores. 
For this reason, we estimate the difference-in-differences model in two steps. First, we investigate 
solely the impact of the school component of the law. Hence, we observe the ENEM scores before 
and after the policy intervention (the introduction of the Law of Quotas in 2013) and between two 
groups: a treatment group composed of white students from public high schools (therefore 
impacted by the school component but not by the racial component of the law); and a control 
group composed of private high school students6 from all ethnicities (i.e., not eligible for any 
quotas – remember that the law does not apply to students who attended private high schools, 
regardless of their race and income class).  
Secondly, we assess the impact of the racial component of the law; that is, the effect on non-white 
public school students. In this case, the ENEM scores are again observed before and after the 
introduction of the law; however, the treatment group is now composed of non-white students 
from public high-schools, and the control group is composed of white students from public high 
schools (that is, both groups are affected by the school component of the law – since they are both 
public high school students - but only the treatment group is affected by the racial component). 
 
6 Those who attended only a part of high school in a private institution also compose the control group, 
since they are not eligible for the quotas. For simplicity, we shall refer to this group as private high school 
(or simply private school) students 
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Standard approaches for causal inferences in difference-in-differences are valid only under the 
assumption that the treatment and control groups display parallel trends before the policy 
intervention – which additionally is assumed to be a good post-treatment counterfactual. The 
previous trends for the control and treatment groups in the school component model are presented 
in Figure 3. The figure shows that, prior to the implementation of the Law of Quotas in 2013, the 
ENEM objective scores of white public school students and private school students present 
relatively similar, although not identical, trends. We tackle this issue following the method 
suggested by Rambachan and Roth (2019) for robust inference in difference-in-differences 
settings where the parallel trends assumption may be at stake.  
Figure 3 - Yearly Average ENEM Objective Score (2010 = 100). Control Group: Private School 
Students; Treatment Group: White Public School Students 
 
In order to apply the methodology proposed by Rambachan and Roth (2019), we estimate the 
following dynamic event-study regression: 
log⁡(𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 + ϕ𝑡 + λ𝐷𝑖
𝑠 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠
𝑠≠2012
× 𝟙[𝑡 = 𝑠] × 𝐷𝑖
𝑠 + 𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑡 denotes the ENEM total score on the multiple choice exam of a student 𝑖 who  took the 
exam in a specific year 𝑡; 𝐷𝑖
𝑠 is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a public high 
school student (i.e., if they belong to the treatment group);⁡?̂? and λ̂ measure the time-specific and 
group-specific fixed effects, respectively; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the student-specific control variables 
described in Table 2; and the coefficients {?̂?} account for the event-study coefficients (which 
17 
 
measure the causal effect of the treatment plus the difference in trends between the treatment and 
control groups), where ?̂?2012 is normalized to zero (remember that 2012 was the last year before 
the implementation of the law).  
When parallel trends hold exactly – and assuming there is no causal effect of the treatment before 
the intervention -, the pre-treatment betas, that is,  ?̂?2010 and ?̂?2011 are both equal to zero, since 
there is no difference in the pre-treatment trends between the two groups, and the post-treatment 
betas, that is ?̂?2013 to ?̂?2016 correspond to the dynamic treatment effect in each year relative to 
our reference period 2012.  When parallel trends do not hold, however, the pre-treatment betas 
are significant and the post-treatment betas account for the dynamic treatment effect plus the post-
treatment difference in trends (differential trends). In this case, a common approach for inferring 
causality is to assume that the pre-treatment differential trend will persist after the treatment and 
simply perform a linear extrapolation of it to the post-treatment period7. Rambachan and Roth 
(2019) propose an alternative approach to deal with this issue by considering robustness to some 
degree of deviation from the pre-existing differential trend. They introduce a parameter 𝑀 which 
governs the maximum possible error of the linear extrapolation of the pre-treatment differential 
trend8, therefore allowing us to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to violations of parallel 
trends. 
We replicated the analysis for the racial component model. Figure 4 presents the previous trends 
for the control and treatment groups, and a simple visual inspection tells us that the parallel trends 
assumption seems to hold better in this case.  
 
7 There have been concerns, however, that assuming that pre-existing differences in trends continue in 
precisely the same way may be misleading (Lee and Solon 2011; Wolfers 2006). 
8 𝑀 governs the maximum amount by which the slope of the pre-treatment differential trend can change 
between consecutive periods. Take an illustrative example consisting of three periods 𝑡 = −1, 0, 1, in which 
individuals receive a treatment between periods 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 1; 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) denote the potential 
outputs of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡 associated with the treatment and control conditions, respectively; and 
𝐷𝑖  is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is entitled to the treatment. Let 𝛿1 =
𝐸[𝑌𝑖,1(0) − 𝑌𝑖,0(0)|𝐷𝑖 = 1] − ⁡𝐸[𝑌𝑖,1(0) − 𝑌𝑖,0(0)|𝐷𝑖 = 0] be the post-treatment differential trend (note 
that it does not include the treatment effect) and 𝛿0 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖,−1(0) − 𝑌𝑖,0(0)|𝐷𝑖 = 1] − ⁡𝐸[𝑌𝑖,−1(0) −
𝑌𝑖,0(0)|𝐷𝑖 = 0] be the pre-treatment differential trend. 𝑀 is therefore defined so that 𝛿1 − 𝛿0 ≤ 𝑀. See 
Rambachan and Roth (2019) for further details. 
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Figure 4 – Yearly Average ENEM Objective Score (2010 = 100). Control Group: White Public 
School Students; Treatment Group: Non-white Public School Students 
 
At the same time, we again use Rambachan and Roth (2019) to evaluate the robustness of the 
model’s results to deviations in the parallel trends assumption. To this end, we estimate the 
following dynamic event-study regression: 
log⁡(𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 + ϕ𝑡 + λ𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠
𝑠≠2012
× 𝟙[𝑡 = 𝑠] × 𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
where our universe is now comprised solely of public high school students; 𝐷𝑖
𝑟 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the student is non-white (i.e., if they belong to the treatment group); 
and the remaining variables are the same as for Equation 1.  
Furthermore, for the racial component model, we will also test for the heterogeneous effects of 
the law on the different subjects of the exam, between genders and between students with and 
without college-educated parents. Additionally, we will estimate both a two-periods difference-
in-differences model and a regression with dynamic treatment effects. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. The school component model 
In this subsection, we present the results of our first model, which evaluates the impact of the 
school component of the Law of Quotas. The treatment group in this model is composed of white 
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students from public schools (affected solely by the school component of the law) and the control 
group is composed of students from private schools (unaffected by the law).  
Figure 5 plots set-identified estimations of the treatment effect ?̂?2016 (i.e., the effect in the final 
year for the law to be fully implemented) among different deviations of the pre-existing 
differential trend – in the figure, FLCI stands for Rambachan and Roth’s optimal fixed length 
confidence interval. The entire set of estimated coefficients from Equation 1 is presented in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix. The original OLS estimate in Figure 5 shows the estimated treatment effect 
assuming that the parallel trend holds, while the remaining estimates consider linear 
extrapolations of the pre-treatment differential trend (if 𝑀 = 0, then the linear extrapolation holds 
exactly, while 𝑀 > 0 accounts for changes in the slope of the pre-treatment differential trend). 
The figure shows that the effect of the school component on the students’ ENEM scores is positive 
under the entire set of violations considered (up to 𝑀 = 0.05). In fact, we would need 𝑀 to be as 
large as 0.11 (that is, the slope of the pre-treatment differential trend would have to change by 
0.11 between years in the post-treatment period) in order to reject the null hypothesis that the 
treatment effect is significant (and, in this case, positive).  
Figure 5 – School Component Model Treatment Effect (?̂?2016) Sensitivity to Parallel Trends 
Violations. Original = OLS estimation; FLCI = Optimal Fixed Length Confidence Interval 
 
The bottom line is that we can argue with reasonable confidence that the school component of the 
law did indeed have a positive impact on the eligible students’ ENEM scores, a result that is robust 
to significant variations in the extrapolation of the pre-treatment differential trend (within the 
range of 𝑀 evaluated in Figure 5, we estimate a treatment effect that ranges from a little above 
1% to almost 4%).  
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5.2. The racial component model 
Our second model evaluates the impact of the racial component of the Law of Quotas. As 
previously mentioned, the treatment group in this model is composed of non-white students from 
public schools (affected by both the school and racial components of the law), while the control 
group is composed of white students from public high schools (affected by the school component 
but not by the racial one).  
As in the previous subsection, we begin by presenting the estimations of the effect of the policy 
(the racial component) and the sensitivity analysis of the treatment coefficient ?̂?2016 among 
different values of 𝑀. Again, the entire set of estimated coefficients in Equation 2 is presented in 
the Appendix (Table A.2). 
Figure 6 – Racial Component Model Treatment Effect (?̂?2016) Sensitivity to Parallel Trends 
Violations. Original = OLS estimation; FLCI = Optimal Fixed Length Confidence Interval 
Figure 6 indicates that the racial component of the law also had a positive effect on the treatment 
group’s ENEM scores (varying from approximately 0.5% to 2.5% within the range of M 
considered in the analysis). Again, this effect is robust to significant deviations of the pre-
treatment differential trend’s linear extrapolation. Furthermore, there is no statistical difference 
between the OLS original estimation and the set-identified estimation with positive 𝑀, which is 
yet another indication that the parallel trends assumption seems to hold better in this case. 
Therefore, in the following subsections, we explore the effects of the racial component of the law 
in further detail by making use of the OLS original estimations (that is, assuming that the parallel 
trends hold exactly). First (5.2.1), we present the results of a standard two periods difference-in-
differences model, in which we estimate the average treatment effect for the entire post-treatment 
period (2013 to 2016) – more precisely, we contrast the results of a model with and without the 
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set of control variables . Then, we test for heterogeneous effects by subject of the ENEM exam, 
gender and parental education (5.2.2). Third, we estimate a difference-in-differences model with 
dynamic treatment effects to investigate whether the impact of the law varied throughout the years 
(5.2.3). Finally, the results for a set of robustness checks are presented in 5.2.4. Except when 
stated otherwise, all the models in these next subsections make use of the same control and 
treatment groups as the ones in the current subsection (i.e., the racial component model control 
and treatment groups). 
 
5.2.1. Standard two-periods model 
We start by estimating a standard two-periods model, in which we divide our timespan into a pre-
treatment period (2010-2012) and a post-treatment period (2013-2016). We contrast a model 
containing the set of control variables from Table 2 with a model without controls. Hence, the 
following two regression frameworks are estimated: 
log⁡(𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 +𝛷𝑊 + λ𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖
𝑟𝑊 + 𝑖𝑡 (3) 
log⁡(𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 +𝛷𝑊 + λ𝐷𝑖
𝑟 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖
𝑟𝑊+ 𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
Once again, 𝑆𝑖𝑡 denotes ENEM total score on the multiple choice exam of a student 𝑖 that  took 
the exam in a specific year 𝑡; 𝐷𝑖
𝑟 is a dummy variable that equals one if the student belongs to the 
treatment group;⁡?̂? and λ̂ measure the time-specific and group-specific fixed effects, respectively; 
and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the student-specific control variables described in Table 2. We then introduce 
𝑊, which is a dummy variable that equals one if  𝑡 ≥ 2013 (that is, if it belongs to the post-
treatment period), and finally the coefficient ?̂? measures the average treatment effect throughout 
the entire post-treatment period.   
The first column in Table 4 presents the results of the regression specified in Equation 3 (i.e., 
without the set of control variables), while the second column contains the results of the regression 
specified in Equation 4 (i.e., with controls). The table shows a positive and significant estimated 
treatment effect that does not change significantly between the short and the augmented models, 
despite a substantial increase in the R-squared. Oster (2019) suggests a test for unobservable 
variable bias based on Altonji, et al. (2005) which makes use precisely of these two data (the 
change in coefficients and R-squared between the regression with and without control variables). 
Oster (2019) demonstrates that if the selection of the observed and unobserved controls is 
proportional, we are able to compute an identified set for the coefficient of interest, and then test 
whether this set includes zero. We follow Oster’s recommended specification with 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, so 
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that the bounding set becomes [?̃?, 𝛽∗(1,1)], where 𝛽∗(1,1) = ⁡ ?̃? −
(?̇?−?̃?)(1−?̃?)
?̃?−?̇?
 9. The 
recommended bounding set in our case is [0.0078, 0.0104], which safely excludes zero, thus 
providing evidence that the significant estimated treatment effects observed in Table 4 are not 
driven by non-observable factors. 
In the augmented model, we estimate an average treatment effect of 1.04%. In other words, this 
model suggests that the racial component of the Law of Quotas induced eligible students to attain 
a 1.04% higher score in the ENEM exam, on average, during 2013 to 2016. For the reader’s 
convenience, from this point forward, all the regressions to be presented and discussed include 
the entire set of control variables. 
Table 4 - Racial Component Model without control variables: Standard Two Periods Regression 
(all coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 















Control No Yes 
Observations 1,124,157 1,124,157 
R²  2.31% 18.11% 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis   
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
5.2.2. Heterogeneous effects 
We now use the same two-periods design as in 5.2.1. to investigate whether there were 
heterogeneous effects of the racial component of the law by (i) subject of the exam; (ii) gender; 
and (iii) level of parental education.  
First, we examine the effects per subject. As mentioned in subsection 3.3, the ENEM consists of 
one multiple choice exam (containing four different disciplines: natural sciences, social sciences, 
languages and math) and one essay. Thus, we estimate five separate regressions, so that in each 
model, the response variable is the student’s score in each of the five tests. Figure 7 displays the 
 
9 𝛽 and ?̃? account for the treatment coefficient and R-squared in the augmented regression, ?̇? and ?̇? for the 
treatment coefficient and R-squared in the short regression, and 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the R-squared of a hypothetical 
model that includes both observed and unobserved controls. See Oster (2019) for further details. 
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estimated treatment effect coefficient per subject plus the one for the overall objective exam 
already presented in subsection 5.2.1. 
The effects of the racial component of the law were greater in more quantitative-intensive fields 
(natural sciences and mathematics). Actually, the estimated treatment effect coefficient for the 
essay is not statistically significant, indicating that the racial component of the law might not have 
had any effect on this specific part of the exam. The estimated coefficients for the equations 
summarized in Figure 7 are presented in Tables A.3 to A.7 in the Appendix. 
Figure 7 - Treatment Effect Coefficient (multiplied by 100) per ENEM Subject 
 
Second, we assess the possibility of heterogeneous effects of the racial component between 
genders. To this end, we estimate a two-periods difference-in-differences regression adding 
interactions of the models’ variables by gender. The model is specified as follows: 















𝑚 is a dummy variable that equals one if the student is male and 𝛷𝑚, 𝜆𝑚, 𝛾𝑚⁡and⁡𝛽𝑚 
refer to the incremental time-fixed, group-fixed, control variables and treatment effects, 
respectively, for male individuals. The remaining variables are the ones explained in section 4.2., 
including the response variable, which is the total score on the objective exam.  
Figure 8 presents the estimated treatment effect by gender. The coefficients are not statistically 
different (at a 5% significance level) between males and females and they are also not statistically 
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different from the treatment effect already estimated in section 5.2.1. (?̂? = 1.044). Table A.8 in 
the Appendix contains the remaining estimated coefficients from Equation 5. 
Figure 8 – Treatment Effect Coefficient (multiplied by 100) per Gender 
 
Third, we address whether the racial component of the law had different impacts on students 
whose parents hold different levels of education. Therefore, we estimate the following equation: 















𝑐 is a dummy variable that equals one if either the mother or the father of the student 
holds a college degree and Φc, λc, γc⁡and⁡βc refer to the incremental time-fixed, group-fixed, 
control variables and treatment effects, respectively, for these students. Again, the remaining 
variables are the ones explained in section 4.2. and the response variable is the total score on the 
objective exam. 
Figure 9 displays the estimated treatment effect by level of parental education. The coefficients 
are not statistically different between students with and without college-educated parents and they 
are also not statistically different from the treatment effect already estimated in section 5.2.1. 
(again, at a 5% significance level; however, the estimated treatment effects are different among 
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levels of parental education at a 10% significance level, with a p-value of 8.62%). Table A.9 in 
the Appendix contains the remaining estimated coefficients from Equation 6. 
Figure 9 – Racial Component Model per Level of Parental Education (all coefficients multiplied 
by 100) 
 
5.2.3. Dynamic treatment effects 
In this subsection, we investigate whether the effect of the racial component of the Law of Quotas 
evolved over time. For this purpose, we estimate a dynamic event-study regression such as the 
one in Equation 2 (using the total score on the ENEM’s multiple choice exam as the response 
variable). The only difference in this case is that we are assuming that parallel trends hold exactly. 
Therefore, we normalize all of the pre-treatment betas (i.e. ?̂?2010 to ?̂?2012) to zero and assume 
that the post-treatment betas (i.e. ?̂?2013 to ?̂?2016) measure solely the dynamic treatment effect. 
The dynamic treatment effect coefficients are presented in Figure 10, which indicates that the 
effect of the law on the students’ ENEM scores in the objective exam increased throughout the 
first years after its implementation (the coefficients ?̂?2014 and ?̂?2015 are not statistically different 
at a 5% significance level, but the remaining coefficients in fact are). The entire set of estimated 
coefficients is presented in Table A.10 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 10 - Treatment Effect (multiplied by 100) throughout the Years 
 
5.2.4. Robustness  
Finally, we conduct four robustness exercises in order to further qualify the findings from the 
racial component model. First, we check for the anticipatory effects of the law; then, we perform 
two placebo tests: a first one using only private school students (who are not eligible for the Law 
of Quotas at all); and a second one using 2017, in which the law had already been fully 
implemented, as the cutting year in the difference-in-differences model. Finally, we use an 
alternative database to estimate the effects of the Law of Quotas on non-white students’ high 
school completion rate – using the same two-periods difference-in-differences framework 
presented in previous subsections.  
We start by checking for anticipatory effects of the treatment, that is, we check whether the law 
had any effect on students’ ENEM scores before it was implemented (prior to 2013). First, it 
should be noted that it is unlikely that there should be any anticipatory effects, since (i) the law 
was published on August 29th, 2012, two months before that year’s exam, and (ii) the law stated 
that the quotas (or at least a share of them) should be implemented by the institutions only from 
2013 onwards. A visual inspection of Figure 4 suggests that an increase in the scores of the 
treatment group (supposedly due to the treatment effect) was found only in 2013, which would 
rule out the possibility of anticipatory effects. Nevertheless, we also estimate a two periods model 
following Equation 4 but excluding the years right before and right after the law’s implementation 
(2012 and 2013) from the regression. Table A.11 in the appendix presents the results of this 
model. The treatment effect coefficient remains significant and very close to the coefficient 
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estimated in the augmented model from section 5.2.1. (Table 4), which strengthens the hypothesis 
that there were indeed no anticipatory effects. 
In our second robustness exercise, we perform a placebo test using only students from private 
high schools in both the treatment and control groups. Our concern here is that the increase in the 
ENEM score of non-white students is driven by some other factor other than the Law of Quotas, 
such as noisy data or some unobserved racial driver. Therefore, we estimate a two periods 
difference-in-differences model using non-white students from private schools as the treatment 
group and white students from private schools as the control group. Despite the racial difference 
between the groups, both of them are private school students, which means that they are not 
eligible for the quotas and we should not see any significant treatment effect. The results of this 
estimation are presented in Table A.12 in the appendix. The treatment effect coefficient in this 
case is insignificant, as shown in the table (p-value of 28%), suggesting that indeed there has been 
no effect of the law on private school students. 
Third, we perform another placebo test, in which we use 2017 as the cutting year in the difference-
in-differences model. In section 5.2.3, we found that the effects of the racial component of the 
law increased in each year up to 2016. From 2017 forward, however, it would be reasonable to 
see a stabilization of the effects of the law, due to the number of years since its implementation 
and to the fact that by 2017 the quotas had already been fully implemented by all institutions. 
Therefore, we again estimate a two periods difference-in-differences regression in which the post-
treatment period comprises the years of 2017 and 2018. Table A.13 in the appendix presents the 
estimated coefficients. These results shall be taken carefully since this model does not include the 
work factor and previous academic effort factor variables due to changes in the ENEM’s 
questionnaire (yet another reason why these years were not encompassed in the models from the 
previous sections). Nevertheless, the estimated treatment effect coefficient is insignificant in this 
case (p-value of 71%), which suggests both that the results obtained were not merely a placebo 
effect and that by 2017 the impacts of the law had completely stabilized.  
Lastly, we perform a final exercise in which we use a similar difference-in-differences framework 
as the one in subsection 5.2.1 (a two-periods regression) so as to evaluate the impacts of the Law 
of Quotas on the high school completion rate of non-white individuals. For this estimation, 
however, rather than working with the ENEM microdata, we make use of IBGE’s PNAD 
(Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) – Brazil’s national household sample survey, a 
yearly repeated cross-sectional database with information on housing, demography, migration, 
education, labor and income at both individual and household levels. We focus our analysis on 
young individuals of high-school graduate age (18 to 24 years old) and at the years from 2011 to 
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201510. We then estimate a logistic difference-in-differences regression in which the output of 
interest is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the student completed high school. The 
treatment group in the regression is composed of non-white individuals and the control group by 
white individuals. Finally, we also add to the model a set of control variables from the PNAD 
database, more specifically, we control for: age, gender, state of residence, per capita family 
income, degree of ruralization and work factor – the last two variables are similar to the ones 
described in Table 2. Figure A.1 exhibits the evolution of the high school completion rate for the 
treatment and control groups, while Table A.14 presents the results of the estimation (both 
displayed in the appendix). The table shows that the treatment effect is positive and significant, 
providing evidence that the Law of Quotas had a positive effect on non-white students’ pre-
college effort (as measured by their high school completion rate), and hence yielding further 
robustness to our previous findings. 
 
6. Discussion 
The results obtained suggest that both the school component and the racial component of the Law 
of Quotas induced eligible students to attain higher scores on the ENEM exam. The presence of 
a pre-treatment differential trend in the first model hampers a more detailed evaluation of the 
impacts of the school component of the law, but the sensitivity analysis indicates that the 
significance of the treatment effect is robust to substantial violations in the parallel trends 
assumption. Since we are unsure of the direction and magnitude of the post-treatment differential 
trend, we shall not venture further into this result.  
For the racial component model, however, we were able to explore the results in more depth. 
First, we estimated a standard two-periods difference-in-differences model, which indicated that 
the racial component of the Law of Quotas induced eligible students to attain a 1.04% higher 
score in the ENEM exam, on average, during 2013 to 2016.  
Second, we checked for heterogeneous effects, the main findings being: i) the effect of the law 
was stronger in quantitative-intensive subjects (Math and Natural Sciences) than it was in the 
remaining fields (Language, Social Sciences and the Essay); and ii) the racial component of the 
Law of Quotas did not exert statistically significant differences by gender nor parental education. 
A possible explanation to the former might be that quantitative-intensive subjects might be less 
dependent on socioeconomic background (in other words, hours of self-study for the ENEM exam 
 
10 We abstract from 2010 since the survey was not conducted in that year due to the 2010 Census and from 




in mathematics are less conditioned to the students’ social and home environment). Indeed, a 
number of research studies have suggested that math achievements tend to be more sensitive to 
teachers and schools’ efficiency gains, while reading/linguistic achievements might be more 
dependent on socioeconomic status and parental occupation and/or involvement at school (Perry 
and McConney 2013; Cheadle 2008; Rimm-Kaufman et al. 2007; Sui-Chu and Willms 1996). 
Third, we have also estimated a difference-in-differences model with dynamic treatment effects 
in order to evaluate whether the impact of the law evolved throughout the years after its 
implementation. We found that the treatment effect indeed increased from 2013 to 2016 and, 
therefore, this appears to be a case in which the effect of the policy intervention depends on the 
length of exposure to it. That is, while a student from the treatment group that took the exam in 
2016 had four years to absorb the effects of the treatment and increase their investment in human 
capital, an individual that took the exam in 2013 had only one year to do so. An alternative and 
perhaps complementary explanation is that the increasing treatment effect is due to the design of 
the Law of Quotas. Since the law stated that universities had until 2016 to fully implement the 
quotas, the share of reserved seats presented an upward trend from 2013 to 2016 (see Figure 2), 
which could explain part of the dynamic observed in Figure 10. In any case, the “incentive” effect 
of the policy clearly outweighed the possible “relaxation” effect on students of the increase in the 
number of seats. 
A possible concern that could arise from the estimation of the school component model is that the 
Law of Quotas could have increased competition for seats among private school students and 
therefore have impacted their pre-college performance as well, which would put the suitability of 
the control group at stake. However, the reduction of available seats for these individuals due to 
the law’s implementation was attenuated by an overall increase in the number of seats in federal 
universities by 41% from 2012 to 2016. As we can see in Figure 3, the average ENEM score 
among private school students did not present significant changes after the introduction of the law 
(it may have decreased from 2010 to 2011 but remains reasonably stable thereafter). In order to 
qualify this hypothesis, we also estimated a regression for private school students only from 2011 
to 2016 (excluding the drop in scores from 2010 to 2011 - before the Law of Quotas) with a time-
fixed effect dummy that equals one from 2013 onwards (that is, after the law was implemented) 
and found that this coefficient is insignificant (p-value of 33%), which corroborates the hypothesis 
that the law did not affect the private students' scores. Table A.15 in the Appendix presents the 
results of this estimation. In the same manner, we assume that this 41% increase in the overall 
number of seats from 2012 to 2016 also mitigated any increase in competition for seats among 
white students from public schools that might have arisen from the racial component of the law. 
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Finally, our results suggest that the positive incentives provided by affirmative action, such as the 
mitigation of the discouragement effects described by Cotton et al. (2016) and Furstenberg (2003), 
might have prevailed over any negative incentive effect discussed by the theoretical literature that 
might have stemmed from the policy. Although the empirical investigations that have been 
previously performed were limited and mainly focused on specific universities, most of them 
pointed towards a positive effect of higher education quotas on pre-college effort and academic 
performance as well. Hence, our results both corroborate and strengthen these previous findings.  
These results have strong policy implications as they indicate that educational quotas not only 
enhance the participation of disadvantaged groups in higher education directly through an 
increased number of seats but also by encouraging these individuals to invest in human capital 
and close the performance gap by the end of secondary education. Therefore, this behavioral 
response to the implementation of quotas should not be overlooked and should be taken into 




Several different measures have been implemented in recent years in an attempt to mitigate racial 
inequalities in education. One sort of intervention has been the establishment of reserved seats in 
higher education to specific racial groups and, although there is a rich body of evidence that 
investigates the ex-post effects of these quotas, little research has been done with respect to the 
effects that they have on pre-college academic performance. We contribute to this literature by 
evaluating how the Brazilian 2012 Law of Quotas affected the performance of students on the 
college-entrance exam, the ENEM. 
Our results suggest that both the school component and the racial component of the Law of Quotas 
fostered incentives to pre-college human capital accumulation as it induced eligible students to 
attain higher scores on the ENEM exam. Indeed, the positive effects of the racial component of 
the law increased throughout the first years after its implementation. 
Furthermore, we have also tested for the presence of heterogeneous effects of the racial 
component of the law across a set of different dimensions. While racial quotas had a larger effect 
on the scores of quantitative-intensive subjects than it had on linguistic/humanities related 
subjects, no evidence of heterogeneous effects was found by gender or parental education.  
Although robustness exercises scaffold the validity of our results, we acknowledge some 
limitations in our strategy. First, we had to take an indirect strategy for controlling for the income 
criteria of the quotas, due to data restrictions. Second, we have controlled for a set of observable 
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individual and socioeconomic characteristics, others remaining as non-observable. Third, since 
the ENEM’s microdata does not disclose information on each candidate’s SISU’s application, we 
were not able to control for the actual university the students finally enrolled at (or at least were 
accepted in).  Nevertheless, sensitivity analyses allow us to provide strong evidence that the Law 
of Quotas implemented in Brazil did indeed encourage eligible students to increase their pre-
college academic performance (i.e., that the introduction of quotas in higher education not only 
promotes equity, but also brings about efficiency gains). Thus, this research helps to shed some 
light on the incentives provided by quotas in higher education and hence might serve as a guide 
to educators and policy makers whose aim is not only to increase the equality of educational 
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Figure A.1 – High School Completion Rate (PNAD classification - 2010 = 100). Control Group: 
White Individuals; Treatment Group: Non-white individuals 
 
Table A.1 – School Component Model Dynamic Event Study Regression (all coefficients 
multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Dropout/Grade Repetition 
-4.234 *** 
(0.041) 
State Yes *** Group Fixed Effect 
-7.330 *** 
(0.085) 

































Observations 711,355   
R² 30.62%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    




Table A.2 – Racial Component Model Dynamic Event Study Regression (all coefficients 
multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Dropout/Grade Repetition 
-2.667 *** 
(0.029) 
State Yes *** Group Fixed Effect 
-2.051 *** 
(0.064) 

































Observations 1,124,157   
R² 18.48%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Table A.3 – Racial Component Two Periods Model per ENEM Subject – Languages (all 
coefficients multiplied by 100)  
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-7.315 *** 
(0.093) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
0.628 *** 
(0.035) 





















Observations 1,124,157   
R²  7.89%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    




Table A.4 – Racial Component Two Periods Model per ENEM Subject – Math (all coefficients 
multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-4.273 *** 
(0.119) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
0.728 *** 
(0.046) 





















Observations 1,124,157   
R²  13.25%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Table A.5 – Racial Component Two Periods Model per ENEM Subject – Natural Sciences (all 
coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-3.726 *** 
(0.083) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
0.026 
(0.033) 





















Observations 1,124,157   
R²  10.56%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    





Table A.6 – Racial Component Two Periods Model per ENEM Subject – Social Sciences (all 
coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-5.355 *** 
(0.089) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
1.533 *** 
(0.033) 





















Observations 1,124,157   
R²  13.14%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Table A.7 – Racial Component Two Periods Model per ENEM Subject – Essay (all coefficients 
multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-7.240 *** 
(0.168) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
0.336 *** 
(0.061) 





















Observations 1,124,157   
R²  7.06%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    






Table A.8 – Racial Component Model per Gender (all coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Male  Female  
Marital Status Yes *** Marital Status Yes *** 
State Yes *** State Yes *** 































Group Fixed Effect 
-2.275 *** 
(0.065) 
Group Fixed Effect 
-1.967 *** 
(0.048) 
Time Fixed Effect 
-0.397 *** 
(0.045) 
Time Fixed Effect 
0.806 *** 
(0.045) 
Observations 1,124,157   
R²  18.38%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
  
Note: For ease of exposition, we present the net coefficient for each gender (i.e., in the “Female” 
column we present the coefficients from Equation 5 that do not contain the “m” suffix, whereas 












Table A.9 – Racial Component Model per Level of Parental Education (all coefficients multiplied 
by 100) 
Independent Variables    
With College Degree  Without College Degree  
Marital Status Yes *** Marital Status Yes *** 
State Yes *** State Yes *** 































Group Fixed Effect 
-2.597 *** 
(0.126) 
Group Fixed Effect 
-1.988 *** 
(0.040) 
Time Fixed Effect 
-0.132 
(0.105) 
Time Fixed Effect 
0.387 *** 
(0.039) 
Observations 1,124,157   
R²  18.32%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Note: For ease of exposition, we present the net coefficient for each gender (i.e., in the “Without 
College Degree” column we present the coefficients from Equation 6 that do not contain the “c” 
suffix, whereas in the “With College Degree” column we present these same coefficients plus the 









Table A.10 – Racial Component Model with Dynamic Treatment Effect (all coefficients multiplied 
by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Work Factor 
0.766 *** 
(0.026) 
State Yes *** Dropout/Grade Repetition 
-2.664 *** 
(0.029) 



























Observations 1,124,157   
R²  18.31%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Table A.11 - Robustness Check: Anticipation of Treatment Effect Regression (all coefficients 
multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-4.876 *** 
(0.079) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
0.997 *** 
(0.03) 





















Observations 807,063   
R²  17.71%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    




Table A.12 - Robustness Check: Placebo Test with Private School Students Regression (all 
coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-8.215 *** 
(0.26) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
-2.136 *** 
(0.069) 





















Observations 214,501   
R²  24.82%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Table A.13 - Robustness Check: Placebo Test with 2017 as the Treatment Year Regression (all 
coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-4.477 *** 
(0.063) 
State Yes *** Work Factor No 



















Observations 1,122,718   
R²  18.16%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    





Table A.14 - Robustness Check: Two-Periods Difference-in-differences Logistic Regression – 
Output = High School Completion 
Independent Variables    
State Yes *** Work Factor 
0.077 *** 
(0.013) 
Ruralization Yes *** Group Fixed Effect 
-0.970 *** 
(0.021) 













Observations 205,285   
Nagelkerke R²  14.35%   
Standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
Table A.15 –Model with only Private School Students without Treatment Effect and without the 
Year 2010 (all coefficients multiplied by 100) 
Independent Variables    
Marital Status Yes *** Ruralization 
-8.116 *** 
(0.28) 
State Yes *** Work Factor 
-2.197 *** 
(0.075) 



















Observations 183,632   
R²  24.73%   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
* Significance at 5% level; ** Significance at 1% level; *** Significance at 0.1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
